

~~SECRET~~ // ~~REL MCFI~~



*POWUS*

*CASEY*

# Iraq Update

## 4 January 2006

This briefing is classified

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~~REL MCFI~~

Derived from: Multiple sources  
DECL ON: X1

4 January 2006

**Iltizam Mushtarak - United Commitment**

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03286

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## Situation

- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us well for decisive action in 2006. *PUT LAST 18 MOS TO GOOD USE 17F ~~THE~~ SUNNI IN*
- Appointment of a representative Iraqi government is key to success in 2006. *PERCEIVED*
- Political wrangling over constitutional amendment, federalism and provincial elections will dominate early tenure of new government.
- Violence and intimidation will continue to be used to generate political effect. *INSURE POLITICAL TURN - TALK FRANT*
- Recent operations have disrupted Al Qa'eda in Iraq; must continue to split them from Sunni population. *MUSUL/BO-3/W*
- Impacts of election, security transition and coalition reductions will not be seen immediately. Expect reductions in insurgent violence to be gradual. *WEAV- PEOPLE MUST REFLECT*
- Perception of increased 1.4b, 1.4d will continue to polarize Iraqi society.

*GREAT SUCCESS -> TO GET WHERE WE ARE - TIME OF RE-CHURN*  
**Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment**

~~SECRET~~ /REL MCFT 1

*IN WHAT IS UNUSUALITY A POL STRATEGY*

~~SECRET~~ /REL MGFI



SECURITY  
INCLUSIVE GOVT  
CULTURE OF RECON/ROL  
RECON/INT SPT

## 2006 Challenges

- Forming government and building government capacity at national and provincial levels to meet basic needs of the population and establish rule of law. *INCLUSIVE*

- Sectarian tensions inhibiting government and security force development. *SHIA DOM / SUNNI REGAIN* *DELTA IT WILL* *FUELED BY CULTURE OF RECON*

- Interference by 1.4b and inability/unwillingness of 1.4b to halt insurgent/foreign fighter support.

- Increased pressures of three years of coalition presence. *FIRST VISITORS* *TIRED OF US*

- Increased pressures for Iraqi freedom of action. *SOV/TIMELINE/COA*

- Developing political element of insurgency will increase complexity of military operations. *AS TALKING TO PEOPLE W/IT'S* *RETAIN STANCH / OFFENSIVE MINDSET*

- Balancing operations and troop reductions in a more complex environment. *TOOLS & HOW TO GET JOB DONE*

GOOD BUY-IN ON STRAT / REACTIONS RESULT OF THEIR SUCCESS / NEW UNITS  
COIN READINESS  
Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment

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*Terrorists + SD no longer a threat*  
*ISF provides for safety of citizens*  
*NO SAFE HAVEN*

## 2006 Key Security Tasks

- Defeat Al Qa'eda in Iraq, *split from AQ* and continue neutralizing Rejectionist insurgency to reduce levels of violence. *level continued*
- Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF. *MIL OC*  
*PO/IN 07*
- Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police. *improve fuel & Q of police border*
- Support transition of the new Security Ministries and conduct of Provincial elections and Constitutional Referendum.
- Support Iraqi government efforts to limit the influence of “militias”.
- Support ISF in securing borders. *close to independent ops*
- Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities. *B/M/BA/NAT/KIRKUK*  
*F/BAQ/SAM/RAM/ABNL*
- Transfer detention operations to Iraqis and implement detainee integration process. *RECONCILIATION*

*AQ OUT - SUNNI IN - ISF IN LEAD - MO*

2006

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Coalition Transitions

★ Campaign Assessment

Campaign Assessment ★

Government Formation

Provincial Elections (T)

Constitutional Debate

Constitutional Referendum (T)

LAST RS4 - NOV  
MTR - FALL  
SIGFO - FALL

~75% of Army  
Brigades in  
Lead

HSC - SPRING  
OFF/ACO - SPRING

~80% Army  
Divisions in  
Lead

LVL 1

~ 80% Special Police  
BDEs TRA 2

~ 60% Iraqi Police  
Service TRA 2

~ 50% Department of Border  
Enforcement TRA 2

- 450/750 SIGFO TRF  
- 18/19 NOV  
- KUAL / NAS/  
- DIN SIGFO TRF

★ Offramp Decision Point

★ Offramp Decision Point

★ Offramp Decision Point

~~SECRET//REL MCFI~~



## ***Bad Things That Could Happen***

- Shia government drives sectarian vice inclusive agenda.
- Sunni insurgents link with Al Qa'eda to hedge against Shia 1.4b, 1.4d
- 1.4b, 1.4d ■ Government unable to establish control over armed groups. FIS  
PSI  
MICKA
- Security forces fracture along ethnic lines.
- Iraqi government demands greater control over coalition military operations and/or timetable for coalition withdrawal.
- Resources for economic development fail to materialize.
- Iraqi detainee situation deteriorates.
- Sectarian violence bubbles over into civil war.
- Coalition force reductions embolden terrorists and insurgents.

2006											
JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC

Coalition Transitions

*CCRP/2 DIV/10 BDES*

Government Formation

Constitutional Debate



Campaign Assessment

Provincial Elections (T)

Constitutional Referendum (T)

Campaign Assessment



75% of Army  
Brigades in  
Lead

*HSC  
SPNAC  
OFF/MCO SPNAC*

80% Army  
Divisions in  
Lead

*LAST RSU - NOV - FOX*

*FALL -  
MTR  
FALL -  
SIG-EO*

~ 80% Special Police  
BDEs TRA 2

~ 60% Iraqi Police  
Service TRA 2

*Which Programs to be 100%?*

~ 50% Department of Border  
Enforcement TRA 2

*- 450/750  
SPNAC TRA 2  
- 18/18 PROV  
- KURDISTAN SE 4  
NATAP  
- MIN/SAL/MURIN  
PROBLEMS*

*MTR O>*



Offramp Decision Point



Offramp Decision Point




Offramp Decision Point

~~RET//REL~~ ~~ISA AND MCFI~~



# MNF-I FOBs in/near the 9 Key Cities




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# MNF-I FOBs in/near the Remaining 21 Cities\*

Tal Afar FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> Sykes
Bayji FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> Summerall
Tikrit FOBs	
<u>In</u> Danger**	<u>In Vicinty</u> Speicher Remagen
Karbala FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> None
Al Hillah FOBs	
<u>In</u> Charlie	<u>In Vicinty</u> None
As Samawah FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> Camp Samawah Smitty
An Nasariyah FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> Adder Cedar Mittica



Irbil FOBs	
<u>In</u> Ghost	<u>In Vicinty</u> Zaytun
Sulamaniyyah FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> None
Ad Diwaniyah FOBs	
<u>In</u> Echo	<u>In Vicinty</u> None
Al Kut FOBs	
<u>In</u> None	<u>In Vicinty</u> Delta
Basrah FOBs	
<u>In</u> Basrah Palace Old State Building Shatt Al Arab Hotel Al Faw Peninsula	<u>In Vicinty</u> Basrah Air Station Shaibah Log Base


In: FOB inside built up area  
In vicinity: FOB on outskirts of built up area  
\* 21 urban areas targeted for transfer as part of the transfer of urban areas  
\*\* FOB Danger transfers to IA on 22 Nov C

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI // 20151212~~




## Current IA TRA level by DIV HQ/ BDE HQ/ BN

\* Divisions and Brigades icons are the headquarters only- not the cumulative unit



2/3/1 TRA level was reduced from TRA level II to TRA level III, but maintained battlespace.





MNF-I

~~FOUO~~

## Sample POI Day 1

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
0800-0830	Overview	Classroom	Commandant
0830-0930	Fundamentals of an Insurgency	Classroom	(b)(3), (b)(6)
0930-1200	Counterinsurgency Doctrine	Classroom	
1200-1300	Lunch	DFAC	
1300-1400	LIC	Classroom	
1400-1500	Foreign Internal Defense	Classroom	
1500-1630	Leadership in Counterinsurgency	Classroom	
TBD	Campaign Plan	Classroom	CG
TBD	Corps, Division Cdr Guidance	Classroom	Corps Cdr / Div Cdr
1730-1830	Dinner	DFAC	

COIN CFE

*"The Insurgency Stops Here!"*

~~FOUO~~



MNF-I

~~FOUO~~

## Sample POI Day 2

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
0800-1200	COIN Center of Gravity Analysis	Classroom	(b)(3), (b)(6)
1200-1300	Lunch	DFAC	
1300-1530	I/O Campaign w/ PE	Classroom	MNC-I (b)(3), (b)(6)
1530-1630	Population Needs, Security, CMO	Classroom	
1630-1800	Detainee Ops	Classroom	TF 1.4a
1800-1900	Dinner	DFAC	

COIN CFE

*"The Insurgency Stops Here!"*

~~FOUO~~



MNF-I

~~FOUO~~

## Sample POI Day 3

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
0800-0930	Exploitation, Technology, Interagency Intel	Classroom	MNC-I
0930-1130	G2X Local <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">1.4c</span>	Classroom	(b)(3), (b)(6)
1130-1230	Lunch	DFAC	
1230-1330	Targeting	Classroom	
1330-1430	Mission Planning / Parallel Planning	Classroom	
1430-1600	Leadership	Classroom	CJSOTF
1600-1900	Bde, Bn, and Co Lessons Learned Iraqi Perspective	Classroom	Bde Cdr, Bn + Co Cdr, Iraqi Mil/Pol.
1900-UTC	Iraqi Semi-formal Dinner	DFAC	

COIN CFE

*"The Insurgency Stops Here!"*

~~FOUO~~



MNF-I

~~FOUO~~

## Sample POI Day 4

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
0800-0930	Counter IED: Staff Planning and Analysis Considerations	Classroom	CJTF <span>1.4a</span>
0930-1100	Intel Brief for PE	Classroom	Guest Briefer
1100-1200	Debrief Asset for PE	Classroom	Small Group
1200-1300	Lunch	DFAC	
1300-1800	Counterinsurgency Planning PE	Classroom	Small Group
1800-1900	Dinner	DFAC	

COIN CFE

*"The Insurgency Stops Here!"*

~~FOUO~~



MNF-I

~~FOUO~~

## Sample POI Day 5

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
0800-0900	Debrief Asset for PE (exploitation)	Classroom	Small Group
0900-1130	Counterinsurgency Planning PE (exploitation)	Classroom	Small Group
1130-1230	Lunch	DFAC	
1230-1530	Counterinsurgency Planning PE (exploitation)	Classroom	Small Group
1530-1630	Student Presentations on How They Will Organize for Success in the COIN Fight	Classroom	(b)(3), (b)(6)
1630-1730	Course AAR	Classroom	
1730-1800	Closing Remarks	Classroom	Commandant
1800-1900	Dinner	DFAC	

COIN CFE

*"The Insurgency Stops Here!"*

~~FOUO~~



# Weekly Summary

24-30 Dec 05

- Weekly Operations Total: 440 / 387
  - 204 / 191 were Combined Operations with ISF
  - 103 / 108 were Independent ISF Operations
  - 133 / 88 were CF only Operations
  - 49.4 % were Combined Operations
  - 27.9 % were Independent ISF Operations
  - 22.7 % were CF only Operations
- All Operations resulted in AIF:
  - Caches Found = 89 / 137
  - IEDs Found & Cleared = 160 / 153
  - AIF Detained = 454 / 275
  - Bomb Makers Captured/Killed = 2 Captured; 2 Killed/ 2 Captured; 0 Killed
  - Foreign Fighters Captured/ Killed = 7 Captured; 6 Killed/ 1 Captured; 8 Killed
  - HVIs Captured/Killed = 1 Captured; 0 Killed/ 0 Captured; 0 Killed

Blue: 17 - 23 Dec  
Red: 24 - 30 Dec

	Monthly Average	Month Totals (Dec)	1 June to Date
AIF Detained	1,553	1,526	10,820
AIF Killed	296	175	2,064
IED F/C	541	683	3,766
Cache	241	399	1,680
FF Det /Killed	42/ 39	22/ 27	291/ 272

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



## Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Command and Control
- Training
- Sustainment/Logistics
- Equipment
- Leadership

Iraqi Army Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in June 05 Baseline)					
Army Unit Rating	Fully Capable Level 1	Capable with CF Support Level 2	Partially Capable Level 3	Unit Forming Level 4	Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting
Division HQs (10)	0 (0)	2 (0)	6 (4)	0 (4)	2 (2)
Brigade HQs (36)	0 (0)	11 (4)	20 (22)	2 (3)	3 (6)
Battalions (112)	1 (1)	42 (26)	51 (54)	4 (8)	14 (21)
Total Units	1 (1)	55 (30)	77 (80)	6 (15)	19 (29)

~~SECRET//REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



## Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)

Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Training
- Leadership
- Station Effectiveness
- Force Protection
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Equipment
- Threat

Iraqi Police Status as of December 2005 (# Reported in September 05 Baseline)					
Police Unit Rating	Effective Level 1	Effective With Limitations Level 2	Considerable Limitations Level 3	Ineffective Level 4	Unit Not Formed/ Not Reporting
Provincial HQ (18)	2 (2)	10 (10)	5 (5)	1 (1)	0 (0)
Special Police Brigades (8)	0 (0)	1 (0)	7 (8)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	2 (2)	10 (10)	13 (13)	1 (1)	0 (0)

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## Coalition Force Support to TRA Level II Units

### ■ Sustainment / Logistics:

- ISF Level II capability: Forecast and requisition supplies and support; conduct operator maintenance
- CF provide:
  - Coordinate and follow-up with MoD to establish life support contract
  - Fund life support contracts or provide services if contracts fail
  - Common supplies and fuel
  - Vehicle recovery and evacuation
  - Ground and air transport to augment moves
  - Emergency care to stabilize patients and transport to Iraqi health system
  - Training Support through Unit Partnership Program

### ■ Fire Support:

- ISF Level II capability: None required; No IA fire support systems (air or ground)
- CF provide: Access to Joint Fires

### ■ EOD:

- ISF Level II capability: None required
  - Bomb disposal companies forming (1 per division) - currently lack equipment and training
- CF provide: EOD clearance and investigative analysis of attack sites

### ■ Command and Control:

- ISF Level II capability: Capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations; able to send and receive reports and orders from higher/lower echelons
- CF provides:
  - augmented staff planning
  - Coalition Units provide command and control of select Iraqi Units (until IA Higher HQs achieves TRA 2)

~~SECRET//REL MCFI//X1~~



## Coalition Force Support to TRA Level II Units

### ■ Engineer:

- ISF Level II capability: None required
  - Engineer companies forming (1 per division) – currently lack equipment; no vertical or horizontal capability
- CF provide:
  - Construction assets in support of IA basecamp construction
  - Provide training support through unit partnership program
  - Military bridging to support IA river crossing operations
  - All route clearance and route maintenance operations

### ■ Communications:

- ISF Level II capability: Able to maintain external communications with higher
  - Signal companies not yet formed (1 per division)
  - IDN (internet capability) not developed
- CF provide: redundant communications capability

### ■ ISR:

- Level II capability: None required
  - Scout platoons formed in all divisions; have fixed wing seeker aircraft (camera capability); MI companies are developing with LLVI (1 per division)
- CF provide: general intelligence support

### ■ Transition Teams:


- Coalition Units provide "out of hide" MiTTs
- Support to MiTTs: Must provide QRF, Joint Fires, medical, and logistics support to transition teams nation-wide

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
## Projected IA Brigades Assumption of TRA Level I (based on DEC TRA data)

Assumed Best Case Conditions

50% TRA I By  
DEC 06



75% TRA I  
By MAR 07



BDEs in Al Anbar and Ninevah- 12 months added to the assumption of battlespace month.

BDEs in Baghdad, Salah Ad Din, Babil, and Diyala- 9 months added to the assumption of battlespace month.

BDEs in the remainder of Iraq- 6 months added to assumption of battlespace month.


Uncertain of Force Generation timeframe of 3/9 or if unit will be formed.

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Icons  
based on  
final IA  
Brigade  
locations



## Projection of TRA Level I AO Months Added



~~SECRET//REL MCFI//20151226~~

# Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)


★  
Projected  
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



\* 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in

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
# 06 - 08 Combat Formation Decision Points



# Ethnicity of Senior Staff



## Overall MOD/IAF Ethnicity





*Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I)*  
*NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I)*

***IRAQI SECURITY FORCES UPDATE***  
***4 January 2006***

(b)(6)

*“The only way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him.” – Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1945*

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
## *Agenda*

- MNSTC-I Lines of Operation
- Force Generation
- Intangibles
- Professionalization of the Force
- Accelerating Iraqi Army Transition
  - Logistics
  - Communications
  - Officers
- Year of the Police
- Ministry Development
- Issues
- Summary

(b)(6)



## *MNSTC-I Lines of Operations*





## *Force Generation: Iraqi Security Forces*

**Ministry of Interior Forces  
Trained and Equipped**

**118,152**

**Ministry of Defense Forces  
Trained & Equipped**

**105,803**

**223,955**

77,525 Police (includes SWAT and  
Province ERUs)  
9,512 Civil Intervention Force (PO Div)  
9,713 Police Commandos  
439 Emergency Response Unit  
18,672 Border Enforcement  
1,729 Highway Patrol  
562 Dignitary Protection  
92,165 Iraqi Army (Combat)  
1,606 Special Operations  
10,745 Combat Support, Service  
Support, & Training Units  
489 Air Force  
798 Navy

**128 battalions in the fight, 53 battalions in the  
lead, 34 battalions own battlespace**

As of: 27 Dec 05

**SECRET**



## *Intangibles*

- ***COURAGE***
- ***RESILIENCY***
- ***LEADERSHIP***
- ***ETHNIC DIVERSITY***
- ***CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY***
- ***SECURITY MINISTRY RIVALRY***

Professional Iraqi Security Forces achieved through standardized training, leader development, embedded transition teams, and partnering with Coalition units.

## PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE FORCE

### Police

- 5 Police Academies
- 1 Officer College
- 1 Border & Customs Police Institute
- 2 Special Police Institute

### Army


- 2 Basic Training Centers
- 1 Enlisted Specialty Skills Center
- 3 Junior Officer Academies
- 1 Joint (Intermediate) Staff College
- 1 National Defense University

**Transition Progress:  
60% Iraqi Instructed**

### Out-of-Country

1.4b International Police Training Center  
NATO Schools (225 in CY05)

*Newest Initiative: Center for Ethics and Leadership*





## *Iraqi Army Transition Challenges*

- **Logistics**
- **Communications**
- **Officers**



## 2006: *“The Year of the Police”*

- **Build-out the “Objective Civil Security Force”**
  - ✓ 135,000 Police in 978 stations in 102 cities
  - ✓ 28,000 Border Police
  - ✓ 25,000 Special Police Commandos
  - ✓ 6,000 Highway Patrol
- **Establish 134 Police Transition Teams, 38 Special Police Transition Teams, 26 Border Transition Teams, and 4 Border Support Teams at Ports of Entry**
- **Transition Baghdad Police College from production of police to production of police officers (Leader Development)**
- **Establish by Summer 2006 a “Police Center for Ethics and Leadership”**
- **Evolve the Special Police Commandos to a “Gendarmerie-like” capability and disperse them geographically**
- **Develop and implement a maintenance concept for the Iraqi National Police**



## *Development of the Security Ministries*

- *Developing both institutions from foot soldier and policeman to minister*
- *Focusing on 8 key systems necessary for the ministries to support the fight*
- *Building a professional, enduring civil service*
- *Measuring progress against action plans and milestones*

*Ministry of Interior currently capable but inefficient.  
Ministry of Defense largely dependent on Coalition*



## *Issues*

- **ARMED GROUPS**
  - ✓ **MILITIAS**
  - ✓ **FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICES (FPS)**
  - ✓ **PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS (PSD)**
- **LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE SECURITY MINISTRIES**
- **FINANCIAL TRANSITION**
  - ✓ **FOREIGN MILITARY FUND (FMF) BEGINNING FY08**
- **FINDING THE BALANCE**





## *Summary*

- ***Force Generation on track***
- ***Ministry Action Plans in place***
- ***Professionalization initiatives for Iraqi Security Forces are underway***
- ***Plans in place for accelerating transition in logistics, communications, and leadership development***




## *Combat Unit Transition Challenges*

- **Logistics**
- **Communications**
- **Officers/NCOs**



# Logistics Concept






# Regional Support Units Force Generation Schedule

		2005					2006					2007									
		N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
Taji RSU	IOC														★ FOC						
KMTB RSU	IOC										★ FOC										
Habbaniyah RSU	IOC														★ FOC						
Al Kasik RSU	IOC											★ FOC									
Al Numaniyah RSU	IOC											★ FOC									

★ LOG TRA Level 1 Capacity



## Motor Transport Regiments Accelerated Force Generation Schedule



★ Accelerated Completion Date

★ Original Completion Date

*Motor Transport Regiments are key enablers of logistics support.  
They will be accelerated by 10 months.*




## *Headquarters Support Companies Training*

	% Trained	Completion Date
1 <sup>st</sup> Div	59%	MAR 06
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div	39%	MAY 06
3 <sup>rd</sup> Div	42%	APR 06
4 <sup>th</sup> Div	124%	JAN 06
5 <sup>th</sup> Div	63%	MAR 06
6 <sup>th</sup> Div	54%	MAR 06
7 <sup>th</sup> Div	31%	MAY 06
8 <sup>th</sup> Div	107%	JAN 06
9 <sup>th</sup> Div	137%	JAN 06
10 <sup>th</sup> Div	95%	FEB 06

*All Headquarters Support Companies complete Military Occupation Specialty training at Iraq Army Service and Support Institute by May 2006*



# Signal Company Force Generation Schedule



*Signal Companies are key enablers of communications support.  
They have been accelerated to match battlespace handover*



# Officer and NCO Requirements and Generation Plan



Units report 4,758 of 7,203 officers = 66% of requirement; shortage is 2,445

Units report 22,230 of 37,174 NCOs = 60% of requirement; shortage is 14,944

	Dec 05	Jan 06	Feb 06	Mar 06	Apr 06	May 06	Jun 06	Jul 06	Aug 06
Officers	88	400	400	400	400	577	400	208	224
Total Officers	88	488	888	1,288	1,688	2,177	2,577	2,785	3,009
NCOs	2,200	2,000	2,000	2,200	2,000	2,000	2,200	2,000	2,000
Total NCOs	2,200	4,200	6,200	8,400	10,400	12,400	14,600	16,600	18,600

Officer Generation conducted at three 1-Year Military Academies (Sandhurst model) and four Former Officer Course locations.

NCO Generation completed through Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses taught at ten Division-level Regional Training Centers and one National Military Training Base.

## Political Update – January 4, 2006



~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

Classified by Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad

E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

DECL. 1/03/2016

## Political Update



## Overview

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### Election Issues


- IECI Board expected to finish deciding on “red” complaints by January 3.
- IECI will announce preliminary results January 8 and final results around January 20 – after IMIE releases findings or press statement.
- IMIE team began arriving on January 1 – full team arrived January 3.
- Political parties (Sunni and Allawi) are hoping IMIE produces:
  - Assessment of over-aggressive Shia campaign
  - Assessment of any election fraud issues
- Political parties want this report as leverage against the Shi’a during the government formation negotiations. If IMIE reports negative findings (i.e. voter intimidation favoring the Shi’a Alliance), Sunni/Allawi parties can argue for more sought-after positions.

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## Preliminary Election Results



### Latest Election Data



#### NOTES:

-- Shi'a Alliance & Kurdish Alliance = 182 seats (2 short of 2/3 majority) – could meet with support of al-Rissaliyun (Sadrist)

-- Kurdish Alliance and **Sunni blocs** and Allawi = 135 seats

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## Post-Election Government Transition



### Progress Towards Unity Government

- Talks are still preliminary because the results are still uncertified, and the Sunni Arab bloc and the Iraqi National List still publicly await the results of the IMIE observer visit.
- Talks could be protracted. Two roughly equal blocs appear to be coalescing, each with a claim to half the seats of the Council of Representatives.
- The Kurds, Sunnis and Allawi coalesce on one side, with the Shi'a alliance on the other.
- Kurdish leaders are playing a central role. SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakeem addressed the Kurdish Parliament December 27; PM Jafari visited Barzani and Talabani January 1; Sunni leaders met Barzani and Talabani January 2.
- The Sunni bloc and the Iraqi National List speak publicly about the need for a National Unity Government, but they want a government where ministry distribution is not dependent on election results. Instead, they want equal shares for each party, regardless of its performance at the ballot box. Shi'a Alliance leaders have publicly rejected this idea.

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## Post-Election Government Transition

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### Potential Prime Minister Candidates

#### FRONTRUNNERS

- Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari (Dawa) – candidacy opposed by many within the Shi'a Alliance, but has the advantages of incumbency.
- Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi (SCIRI) – running into turbulence within the Shi'a Alliance.

#### OTHER CANDIDATES

- Deputy TNA Speaker Hussein Shahrastani (Independent) – trying to secure support of Shi'a independents. Not seen as a serious contender.
- Nadim Jabiri (Fadhila) – a potential compromise candidate if deadlock continues between Jafari and Abdul Mehdi.
- Outside of 555?

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# **USCENTCOM** **"Long War Update"**

*for*  
**President Bush**  
**4 January 2006**


The overall classification  
of this briefing is:

**SECRET//NOFORN**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS IED

# CENTCOM Theater of War



~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA AUS GBR~~



**2005...**

**In a year of many challenges we emerge in a better strategic position today than this time last year...**

- Iraq stabilizing, new government emerging, security forces developing
- Afghanistan emerging as a real state
- Al Qaida weakened, popularity damaged, hurt militarily
- Saudi Arabia killing terrorists, stepping toward reform
- Pakistan bolstering efforts against extremists
- Syria pressuring extremists out of self-preservation
- Theater-wide intel sharing and cooperation greatly improving
- Our military forces winning every fight

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~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA AUS GBR~~



## 2006: Opportunities and Dangers

### Opportunities to...

- Shift counter-insurgency fight to regional forces ✓
- Solidify counter-terrorist effort throughout the region ✓
- Unravel Al Qaida and other associated extremist groups in the region
- Pressure 1.4b toward moderate behavior
- Encourage further political reform

### Dangers from...

- Al Qaida reinventing itself as popular anti-US resistance ✓
- Shia-Sunni violence escalating throughout the theater
- Oil infrastructure targeted and damaged
- Key leaders falling to assassination
- 1.4b
- Terrorists acquiring WMD

~~SECRET/REL USA AUS GBR~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA AUS GBR~~



## ***Our Tasks in 2006***

- **Main effort to Iraqi stability:**  
Legitimate government + effective security forces + economic opportunity = stability
- **Secondary effort to Afghan security: internationalize effort through NATO, build confidence in government**
- **Hit Al Qaida and its associated movements wherever we find them in virtual or physical battlespace**
- **Anticipate the next terrorist problem: Al Qaida in Africa; Shia terrorism from Hezbollah**
- **Increase efforts to help Saudi Arabia and Pakistan help themselves against extremists**
- **Keep strategic resources flowing to world economy...show naval and air strength, build regional confidence against**

1.4b

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~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA AUS GBR~~



# Afghanistan Overview

- **Secure the political process**
  - Seating of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils
  - Economic infrastructure
  - Subjugating warlords
- **Implement ISAF transition**
- **Develop partner security forces**
  - Sustain ANA progress
  - Shift focus to ANP
- **Secure PAK border; deny safe havens**
  - PAK mil ops in PAK
  - PAK-AFG-US-ISAF coordination
- **Support counter-narcotics efforts**



**OEF transition to NATO-ISAF ongoing;  
Coalition support to ANSF development  
continues as the main effort**

~~SECRET~~ ~~REL USA AUS GBR~~

~~SECRET//REL USA AUS CAN GBR~~

## Joint Warfighting: AFG



### Sensor-to-Shooter Link

- Enemy move toward PAK after attack on Camp Tillman
- Target identified by Predator; down-linked to JTAC's ROVER
- Target destroyed by MK-82 airburst delivered by A-10
- video

1.4c

1.4c

Approved for Release

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## *Joint Warfighting: AFG*



Approved for Release

1.4c

~~SECRET//REL USA CAN AUS GBR~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR~~



## Joint Warfighting: Counter-IED in IRQ

- Shadow UAV detects enemy emplacing IED in roadbed
- Target passed to F-16
- F-16 tracks enemy to new location and destroys
- video

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~

ON NAME:  
FREEDOM

AIROBAT TYPE:  
F-16CG

DOWNGRADING  
INSTRUCTIONS IAW  
THEATER  
DIRECTIVES

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR~~



## *Joint Warfighting: Counter-IED*

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~

**OPERATION NAME:  
IRAQI FREEDOM**

**AIRCRAFT TYPE:  
F-16CG**

**DOWNGRADING  
INSTRUCTIONS IAW  
THEATER  
DIRECTIVES**

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~

UNCLA IED



## ***Joint Warfighting: Earthquake Relief***

**1000 US service-members from all services commanded by RDML LeFever have had a strategic impact with our most important regional partner.**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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## Al Qaida Facilitation Network




*AQSL in FATA increasingly isolated. Saudi CT continues pressuring Al Qaida on the peninsula. Foreign intelligence services pursuing Al Qaida Network. Zarqawi network in Iraq pressured but still capable.*

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## AQAM: The Main Enemy, A Threat in All Realms



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



## ***2005: Effects on Al Qaida***

- **Physically isolated Al Qaida senior leadership**
- **Captured or killed key operatives and significant leaders**
- **Branded their ideology as violent and extremist, and reduced its potential appeal in the region**
- **Gained greater partner nation cooperation in fighting Al Qaida across the region**
- **Pressure on network has prevented attacks on US Homeland**

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## ***AQAM under pressure: some indicators***

- **“Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam.”**
  - Pew Global Attitudes Project – Islamic Extremism (14 Jul 05)
- **“Support for Osama Bin Laden has declined significantly (51% favorable in May 2005 to just 33% in November), while those who oppose him rose over the same period from 23% to 41%. 73% of Pakistanis surveyed in November 2005 now believe suicide terrorist attacks are never justified, up from 46% just last May.”**
  - Pakistan branch of ACNielsen poll for D.C.-based nonprofit Terror Free Tomorrow (Nov 05)
- **“In a survey of more than 1,000 1.4b, more than 87% of the respondents said they now considered al Qaeda a terrorist organization...” compared with only 11% prior to the Amman suicide bombings.**
  - Washington Post (4 Dec 05)

**Need to expose the enemy for what he is.**

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~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~



***But...***

- **Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi still at large**
- **Still seeking WMD**
- **Still capable of global operations**
- **Extremist recruit pool still active and dangerous**
- **Associated movements are emerging**
- **New methods for moving people, money, materiel**
- **We still have not contested their virtual realm**
- **Must improve our own intel**

~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~

~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~



# *What is Needed to Defeat AQAM*

- **Physical capability**
  - Operational capability
  - Increased intel-surveillance-recon (ISR) systems: “unblinking eye”
  - Access
  - (b)(3) 50 USC § 1602 partnership (staff-like access and detailing)
  - Partner nation relationships
- **Authorities and approvals**
  - Authorities do not equal approval to conduct CT operations
  - Simplify and accelerate approval process for operations
  - Delegate: must provide maximum flexibility to the mission commander
- **Make GWOT a truly inter-agency fight**
  - Unity of command
  - Entire inter-agency effort on a wartime footing

~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~

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## ***2006: What to Expect from Al Qaida***

- **Continual push to regain lost popularity**
- **Focus offensive planning efforts against the West**
- **Attack oil infrastructure and create economic havoc**
- **Attack US Homeland**
- **Continued pursuit of WMD capability**
- **Enhance media image**

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~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~



## *For the Long War Ahead We Must...*

- Continue to help others help themselves against extremism
- Enable regional states to take the lead against local insurgencies
- Shift our balance from counter-insurgency lead to counter-terrorism lead
- Posture our forces to keep the counter-terrorist lead against Al Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM)
- Improve our intelligence gathering and targeting methods, especially against WMD
- Evolve our coalition to more readily share the military burden
- Improve integration of international and interagency capabilities: military, political, economic and information
- Invest in human capital: linguists, regional specialists, 1.4c  
1.4c
- Show no weakness to 1.4b
- Expose our enemy's ideology and designs

~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~

~~SECRET//REL GCTF~~



## *The Long War...*

- **21<sup>st</sup> Century Warfare is more about will and perception than it is about territory and enemies killed ✓**
- **Intelligence and precise action are more important than maneuver and mass ✓**
- **Winning comes slowly and subtly but we are winning...everywhere**
- **Regional states are fighting harder than ever...we must help them help themselves more than we must do it for them**
- **We still have too many barriers to decisive action...we must streamline our warfighting efforts across our government**

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# ***Discussion***

Approved for Release

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~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



7 MWK

# MNF-I UPDATE

5 January 2006

This briefing is classified

~~SECRET~~

~~REL USA, AUS, GBR~~

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 25 Dec 2015

*Itizam Mushtarak – United Commitment*

~~SECRET//REL USA//~~

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## ***Situation***

- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us well for decisive action in 2006.
- Appointment of a representative Iraqi government is key to success in 2006.
- Political wrangling over constitutional amendment, federalism and provincial elections will dominate early tenure of new government.
- Violence and intimidation will continue to be used to generate political effect.
- Recent operations have disrupted Al Qa'eda in Iraq; must continue to split them from Sunni population.
- Impacts of election, security transition and coalition reductions will not be seen immediately. Expect reductions in insurgent violence to be gradual.
- Perception of increased 1.4b will continue to polarize Iraqi society.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## 2006 Challenges

- **Forming government and building government capacity at national and provincial levels to meet basic needs of the population and establish rule of law.**
- **Sectarian tensions inhibiting government and security force development.**
- 
- **Increased pressures of three years of coalition presence.**
- **Increased pressures for Iraqi freedom of action.**
- **Developing political element of insurgency will increase complexity of military operations.**
- **Balancing operations and troop reductions in a more complex environment.**

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## ***MNF-I Mission Statement***


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**In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.**

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## Counterinsurgency Lines of Operation



### End-State:

Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects human rights and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~




## ***2006 Key Security Tasks***

- **Defeat Al Qa'eda in Iraq and continue neutralizing Rejectionist insurgency to reduce levels of violence.**
- **Continue transition of counter-insurgency campaign to ISF.**
- **Build police capacity to the point where they can begin assuming lead for internal security – Year of the Police.**
- **Support transition of the new Security Ministries and conduct of Provincial elections and Constitutional Referendum.**
- **Support Iraqi government efforts to limit the influence of "militias".**
- **Support ISF in securing borders.**
- **Support ISF in securing Baghdad and 9 key cities.**
- **Transfer detention operations to Iraqis and implement detainee integration process.**

# Operational Concept

## Counterinsurgency Imperatives



- Deny Enemy Sanctuary
- Deny Freedom of Movement
- Deny External Support
- Isolate Insurgents from Population
- Protect the Population
- Build Effective Local Security Forces
- Integrate political, economic, and information effects



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## Transition Concept



**Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment**


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~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)


  
15 + 1 BCT Set



\* NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07



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## Projection of Iraqi Army Assumption of Battlespace





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# APR06 Iraqi Police Service TRA Projection (as of 04JAN06)



APR06  
Province HQs Projection

Dahuk	Level III
Irbil	Level I
Sulaymaniyah	Level I
Maysan	Level I
Dhi Qar	Level II
Al Basrah	Level II
Muthanna'	Level I
At Tamin	Level II
Diyala	Level II
Wasit	Level III
Babil	Level III
Karbala	Level I
Qadisiyah	Level III
An Najaf	Level I
Ninewa	Level III
Salah Ad Din	Level III
Baghdad	Level I
Al Anbar	Level IV



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~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~

## APR06 Dept. of Border Enforcement TRA Projection (as of 04JAN06)

### APR 06 PROJECTION


12 Brigades

38 Battalions

All 258 Border Forts projected to be complete

DBE Forces		APR06 Projection
Region 1		
1st	BDE	
2nd	BDE	
3rd	BDE	
Region 2		
1st	BDE	
2nd	BDE	
3rd	BDE	
Region 3		
1st	BDE	
2nd	BDE	
Region 4		
1st	BDE	
2nd	BDE	
Region 5		
1st	BDE	
2nd	BDE	

	Level I
	Level II
	Level III
	Level IV



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~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## Transition Planning

- COA 1 "Baseline" 10 + 1 BCTs by Oct 06
- COA 2 "Stretch" 8 + 1 BCTs by Dec 06
- COA 3 "Exploitation" 8 + 1 BCTs by Sep 06

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## ***Key Transition Assumptions***

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces.
- The political process can diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency.
- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track.
- Shi'a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts.
- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006.

1.4b

- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## *Transition Planning Factors*

- MNF Brigade partnered with each Iraqi Army Div HQ until they reach TRA Level 1.
- Maintain continuity between partnered MNF / IA units to the greatest extent possible.
- Theater Security Brigade required through 2006.
- Option remains for three non-US Div HQs.
- As drawdown progresses, must replace “out of hide” MiTTs when below 13 US BCTs.
- Transition Teams required until ISF units meet TRA Level 1.
- Consider non-standard BCT structures where practical.
- Design plan to permit battalion-level off-ramps.
- Fully identify what logistics support we must provide to ISF.
- Next decision points are March 2006 for next step and Call Forward Force.

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


## Off-Ramp Variables



- Threat conditions
- Capabilities of ISF
- Impact on partnerships
- Replacement of Transition Teams
- Ministry capability development
- Almost continuous realignment of battlespace
- Base transfers, consolidation and/or closures
- Enabler adjustment to support Transition Teams and ISF
- Transfer of equipment sets/property accountability
- Realignment of area coverage for Enabling Forces



## COAs Based Off MNF-I Commander Guidance




# Capabilities Over Time (JAN 06)



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# COA 1 "Baseline": 10 + 1 x BCT Set by Oct 06




## Decision Points:

- DP 1: ~21 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT May)
- DP 2: ~28 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT Aug)
- DP 3: ~33 IA Bdes ≥ TRA 2 (NLT Oct)

## Additional Resources Required:

- 15 x Augmented External TTs; plus additional medics and JFOs (~450 Pax)
- Additional MP Capability to support expanded P3
- Joint Enablers (enhanced ISR Capabilities)



**Risk: MODERATE**

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~




# Course of Action 1

## Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.
- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.
- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - ~ 90% IA Bdes TRA 2 NLT Oct 06
  - ~ 50% IPS TRA 2 NLT Oct 06
- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.
- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.
- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~

# COA 2 "Stretch": 8 + 1 x BCT Set by Dec 06



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~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~




## Course of Action 2

### Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.
- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.
- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-N NLT Dec 06
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-B NLT Dec 06
  - All remaining IA Bdes TRA Level 2 NLT Dec 06
  - 60% or greater IPS TRA Level 2 NLT Dec 06
- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.
- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.
- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~

# COA 3 "Exploitation": 8 + 1 x BCT Set by Sep 06



~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## Course of Action 3

### Conditions Impacting Drawdown

- Formation of a representative government by Spring '06.
- Political process begins to diminish violence to levels containable by ISF with coalition enabling support.
- Iraqi Army and Police development continues generally at projected levels.
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-N NLT Sep 06
  - 1 x IA Division TRA Level 1 in MND-B NLT Sep 06
  - All remaining IA Bdes TRA Level 2 NLT Sep 06
  - 60% or greater IPS TRA Level 2 NLT Sep 06
- Improved security in Baghdad and 9 Key Cities.
- Sustain success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and Border regions.
- Security Ministries improve and can sustain forces with coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to coalition reductions.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~




## Take Aways

- Offramps are conditions-based; they will change.
- Level of friction and complexity limits pace of drawdown.
- Effects time lag and transportation cycle compounds decision complexity.
- Sectarian issues still not resolved.
- Accomplished in politically turbulent context.
- Leader and enabler centric versus combat troops.
- Nature of fight is changing.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## Transition of Security Lead Base Plan



**US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF**

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Glose Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## ***Bad Things That Could Happen***

---

- Shia government drives sectarian vice inclusive agenda.
- Sunni insurgents link with Al Qa'eda to hedge against Shia 1.4b
- 1.4b
- Government unable to establish control over armed groups.
- Security forces fracture along ethnic lines.
- Iraqi government demands greater control over coalition military operations and/or timetable for coalition withdrawal.
- Resources for economic development fail to materialize.
- Iraqi detainee situation deteriorates.
- Sectarian violence bubbles over into civil war.
- Coalition force reductions embolden terrorists and insurgents.

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



## ***What Do We Need***

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
- Support for Transition Teams to replace “out of hide” MiTTs.
  - Support for expanded Police Partnership Program.
  - Joint Enablers (to include enhanced ISR capabilities).
  - Limited support to Provincial Reconstruction Team Program.
  - Joint work on counterinsurgency and counter-IED techniques.
  - Patience on reduction planning and decisions.
- 
- Sustain the Coalition.
  - Regional Engagement to halt support to terrorists and foreign fighters and increase support for Iraqi Government.
  - Interagency and International support of Iraqi Government Development.
  - Increased support for economic development initiatives.
-

~~SECRET//REL USA// (Close Hold / Pre-Decisional)~~



Back Up

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# *Iraqi Security Forces Update*

## *9 January 2006*

Iraqi Security Forces ministries provide much of this data.

This brief is classified: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFI//20151212~~

Classified By: GEN CASEY, USA; CDR MNF-I  
Reason: 1.4 (a)  
Declassify On: 9 January 2015

Data as of: 9 January 2006 Version M 1.7

UNCLASSIFIED 1

## *Total all Iraqi MoD and MoI Security Forces\**

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- Ministry of Defense Forces

- Iraqi Army **	~89,800
- Strategic Infrastructure Bns	~3,400
- Support Forces	~10,800
- Special Operations	~1,500
- Air Force	~500
- Iraqi Navy	~800

Trained & Equipped

~106,800\*\*\*

- Ministry of Interior Forces

- Police	~80,400
- Iraqi Highway Patrol	~1,700
- Border Enforcement	~18,700
- Public Order Division	~8,000
- Emergency Response Unit	~400
- Special Police Commandos	~9,100
- 1 <sup>st</sup> Mechanized Brigade	~1,200
- Dignitary Protection	~600

Trained & Equipped

~120,100\*\*\*\*

---

~226,900

\*Excludes approximately 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry of Interior but employed by other ministries. Does not include other site protection services or militias.

\*\*The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, former Iraqi National Guard, former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces.

\*\*\*Ministry of Defense Forces: Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel are not included in these numbers. Unauthorized absences are no longer impacting operations.


\*\*\*\*Ministry of Interior Forces: Exact Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel numbers are unknown. However, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) and the Police Partnership Program (P3s) are gaining better fidelity on MOI present for duty status. As a result, all known police AWOL and casualties have been dropped from the rolls and are not included in these numbers.

Note: Numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces.

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

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Trained and Equipped  
Iraqi Security Forces



May 2003 =  
0 Iraqi Security  
Forces

(1) Ministry of Defense Forces includes: Regular Iraqi Army, Security Infrastructure Forces, Former National Guard, Iraqi Intervention Forces, Special Operations Forces, Combat Support, Service Support Training Units, Navy and Air Forces.

(2) Other Police includes: Highway Patrol, Civil Intervention Forces, Emergency Response Unit, Special Police Commandos and Dignitary Protection

Note: Additionally, 74,000 Iraqis in the Facilities Protection Service have been trained by Ministry of Interior but are employed by other ministries. It should be noted that many Embassies and private contractors also have security forces.

Note: Ministry of Interior Forces: Exact Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel numbers are unknown. However, embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) and the Police Partnership Program (P3s) are gaining better fidelity on MOI present for duty status. As a result, all known police AWOL and casualties have been dropped from the rolls and are not included in these numbers.

Note: Ministry of Defense Forces: Absent Without Leave (AWOL) personnel are not included in these numbers.

Data as of: 9 January 2006

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# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Targets

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCF~~

COMPONENT	CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS	IN TRAINING**	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED 1 MAR 06	ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING & EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY
IRAQI ARMY* (COMBAT)	103,943 112 BNs	1,200	~89,800 98 BNs	106 BNs	DEC '06
STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE BATTALIONS	3,036 4 BNs	480	~3,400 4 BNs	4 BNs	OCT '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,585 2 BNs	86	~1,500 2 BNs	2 BNs	JUN '06
COMBAT SUPPORT, SERVICE SUPPORT, & TRAINING UNITS	19,507 13 BNs	429	~10,800 6 BNs	8 BNs	DEC '06
AIR FORCE	1,141 6 SQDNs	0	~500 3 SQDNs	3 SQDNs	TBD based on Aircraft procurement
NAVY	1,652 3 SQDNs	38	~800 2 SQDNs	2 SQDNs	TBD based on Patrol Boat procurement
TOTAL	130,864 131 BNs 9 SQDNs	3,233	~106,800 110 BNs 5 SQDNs	120 BNs 5 SQDNs	

\*The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, Former Iraqi National Guard, Former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces.

\*\* Individual Level Training Only .

## Estimated MoD Forces Capabilities

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFI~~

COMPONENT	BATTALIONS AUTHORIZED BY IRAQI Ministry of Defense	UNIT CAPABILITY			
		Units being Formed LEVEL 4	Coalition and ISF Fighting Side by Side LEVEL 3	Iraqi Lead with Coalition Support LEVEL 2	Independent Iraqi Operations LEVEL 1
Iraqi Army (Combat)	112	10	45	50	1
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions	4	0	4	0	0
Special OPS	2	0	0	2	0
<b>TOTAL (Combat Units)</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>10 (BNS)</b>	<b>49 (BNS)</b>	<b>52 (BNS)</b>	<b>1 (BNS)</b>
Combat Support, Service Support, & Training Units	13	2	3	3	0
Air Force (Squadron)	6	3	0	3	0
Navy (Squadron)	3	0	0	2	0
<b>TOTAL (Battalions and Squadrons)</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>15 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</b>	<b>52 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</b>	<b>60 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</b>	<b>1 (BNS &amp; SQNS)</b>
<b>AUTHORIZED</b>					
Brigade Headquarters	36	4	18	13	0
Division Headquarters	10	2	6	2	0

**Level 1, 2 and 3 units are engaged in operations against the enemy.**

- Capable. A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- Capable. A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- Partially Capable. A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
- Not capable. A Level 4 unit is being formed at the institutional training base or is not yet capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Data as of: 9 January 2006

## Iraqi Security Forces MoI Targets

~~SECRET//REL TO USA (RQ AND MCEI)~~

COMPONENT	CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS	IN TRAINING**	TRAINED & EQUIPPED*	TRAINED & EQUIPPED 1 MAR 06	ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING & EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY
POLICE	135,000	3,650	~80,400	~85,200	FEB '07
HIGHWAY PATROL	6,262	178	~1,700	~2,100	AUG '07
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	28,360	343	~18,700	~19,800	MAY '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE					
Public Order Brigade	10,595 (12 BNs)	91	~8,000 (12 BNs)	~9,500 (12 BNs)	MAY '06
-1st Mechanized Brigade	1,170 (3 BNs)		~1,200 (3 BNs)	~1,200 (3 BNs)	DEC '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	744	0	~400 (1 BN-Equiv)	~400	JUN '06
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS	11,891	379	~9,100 (12 BNs)	~9,900 (12 BNs)	DEC '06
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	8	~600	~500	MAY '06
TOTAL	194,522	7,886	~120,100	~128,600	

\*Reflects losses in Iraqi Police due to casualties, other losses and personnel decisions.

\*\* Individual Level Training Only .

Data as of: 9 January 2006

# Estimated MoI Special Police Forces Capabilities

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ AND MCFI~~

COMPONENT	BATTALIONS AUTHORIZED BY IRAQI Ministry of Interior	UNIT CAPABILITY*			
		Units being Formed LEVEL 4	Coalition and ISF Fighting Side by Side LEVEL 3	ISF Lead with CF Support LEVEL 2	Independent Iraqi Operations LEVEL 1
Public Order Battalions	12	0	7	5	0
Mechanized Battalions	3	0	2	1	0
Special Police Commando BNS	12	0	9	3	0
Emergency Response Unit	1	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	28	0	18	10	0
	AUTHORIZED				
Brigade Headquarters	9	0	7	2	0
Division Headquarters	2	0	2	0	0


\* Police, Highway Patrol and Border Enforcement are not reflected in the capabilities chart. For conventional police forces, these metrics do not apply.

**Level 1, 2 and 3 units are engaged in operations against the enemy.**

- Capable. A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- Capable. A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- Partially Capable. A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
- Not capable. A Level 4 unit is being formed and is not yet capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

# Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) in Battle Space\*

~~SECRET//REL TO USA-IRQ AND MCFI~~



**Iraqi Security Forces are projected to assume triple the battle space assumed in November. Most progress is expected to take place in the Southern regions of Iraq.**

\*Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) updates this slide monthly using Effects Synchronization Board (ESB) information (Next ESB is 14 Jan 06).

\*\*Battle space where Iraqi Police units are in the lead and working closely with Iraqi Army units is depicted in blue.

Data as of: 17 December 2005

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# *Building Ministerial Capacity*

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# Defense and Interior Ministries Manning

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ AND MCP~~

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I)

• **Manning and Expertise<sup>(1)</sup> :**

– Advisory Support Teams (AST) became Transition Teams (TT) 1 Jan 2006

Required and On-Hand Manning				Interim Solution <sup>(2)</sup>			
	MNSTC-I Assessed Requirements	Advisors On-Hand (23 Dec 05)	Remaining Requirement	JMD	Cross Leveling <sup>(3)</sup> MNF/MNSTC-I		Contractor
MoD-AST	62	36	26	0	5	6	15
JHQ-AST	41	22	19	0	3	11	5
P3 Mol <sup>(4)</sup>	112	76	36	0	3	9	24
Total	215	134	81	0	11	26	44

Iraqi Defense Ministry Officials<sup>(5)</sup>

Authorized      On Hand  
58                      46 (79%)

Iraqi Interior Ministry Officials<sup>(5)</sup>

Authorized      On Hand  
68      Senior Police Officers: 23  
Civilian: TBD

(1) Information from MNSTC-I briefing to SecDef on 23 Dec 05.

(2) Working through CENTCOM / MNF-I to determine progress of filling requirement since 23 Dec 05 briefing.

(3) JMD is being examined for revisions to allow cross leveled personnel to return to previous duty.

(4) Police Partnership Program (P3): MNSTC-I partners with IRMO to develop and strengthen IPS at the strategic level.

(5) Iraqi Ministry Officials information reflects the equivalent of political appointees in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

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# *Building ISF Support Capacity*

*(This section is for SecDef use only and not releasable)*

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## *Building ISF Support Capacity*

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- **Headquarters and Service Companies (HSC)** – Provides tactical level Combat Service Support capabilities to maneuver units supporting counterinsurgency operations.
- **Motorized Transport Regiments (MRTs)** – Provides additional logistical transportation support as required.
- **Mechanized Logistic Battalions** – Provides additional logistic security to the Motorized Transport Regiments.
- **Garrison Support Units (GSUs)** – Provides Direct Support and General Support supply and maintenance to the HSCs supporting maneuver units through a national level maintenance contract.
- **Regional Support Units (RSUs)** – Provides General Support resupply to the GSUs.
- **Taji National Depot** – Provides national level resupply to maneuver units.

## Estimated MoD Logistic Capabilities

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFI~~

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED BY IRAQI MOD	UNIT CAPABILITY			
		Units being Formed LEVEL 4	Coalition and ISF Supporting Side by Side LEVEL 3	Iraqi Lead with Coalition Support LEVEL 2	Independent Support Operations LEVEL 1
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANIES (HSC)	173	124	42	0	0
MOTORIZED TRANSPORT REGIMENTS (MRTs)	9	1	1	2	0
MECHANIZED LOGISTIC BATTALIONS	4	0	0	0	0
TOTAL TACTICAL ASSETS	186	125	43	2	0
GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (GSUs)	68	68	0	0	0
REGIONAL SUPPORT UNITS (RSUs)	5	1	4	0	0
TAJI NATIONAL DEPOT (TND) AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS	3	2	1	0	0
SUPPORT COMMAND	1	0	0	0	0
JOINT HEADQUARTERS M4	1	0	1	0	0
TOTAL OPERATIONAL ASSETS	78	71	6	0	0
MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE)	1	1	0	0	0

**Level 1, 2 and 3 units are engaged in support operations.**

- Fully Independent. A Level 1 unit is fully capable of providing logistic support without coalition support.
- In the Lead. A Level 2 unit is capable of providing logistic support with some Coalition support.
- Supporting Alongside. A Level 3 unit is capable of providing logistic support with significant Coalition support.
- Forming. A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of providing logistic support.

Data as of: 9 January 2006

## *Iraqi Security Forces MoD Logistic Targets*

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ AND MCEI~~

COMPONENT	CURRENT IRAQI AUTHORIZATIONS	IN TRAINING	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED 31 MAR '06	ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING & EQUIPPING COMPLETED BY
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANIES (HSC)	173	TBD	TBD	TBD	JUN '06
MOTORIZED TRANSPORT REGIMENTS (MRTs)	9	774	~2,100 (3 MRTs)	~4,300 (6 MRTs)	DEC '06
MECHANIZED LOGISTIC BATTALIONS	4	0	0	0	JUL '06
GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (GSUs)	68	0	0	0	SEP '06
REGIONAL SUPPORT UNITS (RSUs)	5	774	~3,500 (4 RSUs)	~3,900 (4 RSUs)	SEP '06
TAJI NATIONAL DEPOT (TND) AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS	3	TBD	TBD	TBD	FEB '07
SUPPORT COMMAND	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	JUL '06
JOINT HEADQUARTERS M4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	JUL '06

*BACKUP*

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# Strategy for Supporting Iraq

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## 8 Strategic Objectives for achieving success in Iraq



There are 8 Strategic Objectives, but DOD is the lead for the two security objectives.

## *Ministry of Defense Forces*

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- **Iraqi Army** – Defend Iraq against external threats and, when directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security. Provides command and control for Strategic Infrastructure forces.
- **Special Operations Forces** – Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization and mission to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function. Consists of a Commando Battalion and a Counter-terrorist Task Force.
- **Strategic Infrastructure Battalions** – Defend critical oil and electric strategic infrastructure.
- **Combat Support, Service Support and Training Units** – Provide material and logistics to Iraqi Army.
- **Air Force** – Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities.
- **Navy** - Conduct security operations along the Iraqi coastline and in territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles.

## *Ministry of Interior Forces*

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- **Police** – Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
- **Highway Patrol** – Provide law enforcement, public safety, internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
- **Border Enforcement** – controls Iraq's international borders. Responsible for patrolling borders, enforcing customs, and managing immigration.
- **Civil Intervention Force** – Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and counterinsurgency. Civil Intervention Forces are comprised of two separate units: a Public Order Brigade and the 8<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Brigade.
- **Emergency Response Unit** – Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
- **Special Police Commando Battalions** – Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion.
- **Dignitary Protection** - Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.

## *Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA)*

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- An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions
- TRA assessment areas:
  - Overall Readiness Assessment
  - Personnel
  - Command and Control
  - Training
  - Sustainment / Logistics
  - Equipment
  - Leadership
- As with all nations' security forces, Iraqi units are at varying levels of readiness and experience
  - Some units currently are taking on insurgents and terrorists
  - Most units are planning and executing anti-terrorist operations with Coalition support or in conjunction with Coalition units

Note: For the most part, numbers in this report are estimates derived from reports provided by Iraqi Security Forces.

## *NATO Training Mission – Iraq*

### THIS WEEK:

- **33 Iraqi Students are training out of country**
  - AMEDD Basic x 1
  - Ranger x 5
  - NPS-SPECOPS Masters X 2
  - DLI (Air Command and Staff) X 3
  - Army War College X 1
  - Intermediate Level Education X 1
  - National War College X 1
  - National Defense University Counter Terrorism x 2
  - DLI (ILE) x 1
  - Marine Corps Command and Staff x 1
  - DLI (Armor) x 1
  - DLI (Quartermaster Basic Officer's Course) x 2
  - DLI (Advance Aerospace Medical) x 1
  - DLI (Infantry Basic Officer's Course) x 2
  - DLI (Ordnance) x 1
  - DLI (Aircraft Maintenance Officer) x 2
  - DLI (Air War College) x 1
  - DLI (Intel Officer Advanced) x 4
  - DLI (Engineer Officer Basic) x 1

## *NATO Training Mission – Iraq*

### Future Out of Country Training:

- **23 Future out of country training**
  - Basic Intel 1 seat
  - Program on Terrorism & Sec Studies (PTSS) 1 seat
  - Infantry Career 1 seat
  - AMEDD CPT Career 2 seats
  - Navy Staff College 1 seat
  - Intel Officer Advanced 1 seat
  - C-130 Flight Engineer 1 seat
  - Army War College 2 seat
  - National Defense University Counter Terrorism 1 seat
  - Ranger 5 seats
  - Army CGCS 1 seat
  - AMEDD Basic 2 seat
  - Intel Crisis C2 2 seats
  - US Military Academy 1 seat
  - US Air Force Academy 1 seat

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

UNCLASSIFIED

MoD

MoI

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraq Regular Army	Basic & Skill Training: 8-12 weeks Former Soldier Basic Training: 5 weeks IA Combat Organizational Training CSS Organizational Training	679 1,409 1,429
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit Tactics) 12-week Special Operator Course in Jordan	37
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions	Basic Training: 4 weeks	0
Air Force	Varied by Specialty: 1-6 months	0
Navy	Basic Training: 8 weeks followed by specialized training at Umm Qasr	38
Iraq Police Service	Former Academy Graduates: 3 week TIP New Recruits: 10 week Academy	7,587
Public Order Brigade and Mechanized Police	6 Week and 5 Week Basic Training	0
Special Police Commandos	6-Week Academy Training	256
Emergency Response Unit	4 week Basic; 4 week Specialized Training	0
Dept of Border Enforcement	4-Week Academy and Specialized Training	0
Highway Patrol	3-Week Academy Training	0
Bureau of Dignity Protection	3-Week Initial Training; 2-3 Week Advanced Training Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy Seals	0
TOTAL		11,435

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCF~~

Projected percentage of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces on hand over time\*

Component	Current Iraqi Authorized	9 JAN 06	31 MAR 06	30 JUN 06	30 SEP 06	31 DEC 06
Iraqi Army (Combat) **	103,943 112 BNs	86%	89%	92%	96%	100%
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions	3,036 4 BNs	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Operation Forces	1,585 2 BNs	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Combat Support, Service Support, & Training and Support Units	19,507 13 BNs	55%	58%	75%	75%	100%
Air Force	1,141 6 SQDNs	44%	50%	50%	50%	50%
Navy	1,652 3 SQDNs	48%	50%	60%	60%	70%

\*These percentages do not reflect Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) capability.

\*\* The Iraqi Army consist of the Regular Iraqi Army, former Iraqi National Guard, former Iraqi Intervention Force, and Mechanized Forces

Legend:  85-100 % OF REQUIREMENT  60-84 % OF REQUIREMENT  59 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCT~~

Projected percentage of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces on hand over time\*


Component	Current Iraqi Authorized	9 JAN 06	31 MAR 06	30 JUN 06	30 SEP 06	31 DEC 06
Police	135,000	60%	74%	84%	91%	98%
Highway Patrol	6,262	27%	28%	35%	42%	52%
Border Enforcement	28,360	66%	70%	100%	100%	100%
Civil Intervention Force: Public Order Brigades	10,595	76%	90%	100%	100%	100%
Civil Intervention Force: Mechanized Police Brigades	1,170	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	744	55%	85%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando BNs	11,891	77%	84%	89%	94%	100%
Dignitary Protection	500	100%	At 100%	100%	100%	100%

\*These percentages do not reflect Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) capability.

**Legend:**  85-100 % OF REQUIREMENT  60-84 % OF REQUIREMENT  59 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

# MoD Combat Forces Capability

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFT~~



## MONTHLY REPORTING<sup>(2)</sup>


- Capable. A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- Capable. A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- Partially Capable. A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.

(1) Combat Forces include Iraqi Army only

(2) Embedded Military Transition Teams (MITTs) refined their reporting procedures resulting in more accurate assessments

# MoI Special Police Forces Capability

~~SECRET//REL TO USA IRQ AND MOFI~~



## MONTHLY REPORTING <sup>(2)</sup>

- Capable. A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
- Capable. A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
- Partially Capable. A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.

(1) Combat Forces include Special Police Commandos, Mechanized Police Battalions, Public Order Battalions, and Emergency Response Unit

(2) The majority of the embedded Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) joined their Iraqi counterparts and provided more accurate reporting

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

### TRAIN:

- POB 8 Public Order Training Academy at An Numinayah (24 Dec-9 Feb 06).
- Special Police Forces Company Grade Officer Training at Camp Solidarity 2 Jan-17 FEB 06;  
Special Police Forces NCO Training at Camp Solidarity 6 week course for 100 Students.
- Commando Basic Course at Camp Solidarity starts on 2 January, 6 week course for 279 students.

### EQUIP:

- Issued to Ministry of Defense Forces:
  - 75 vehicles, 0 sets of body armor, 135 weapons, and 1,069,500 rounds of ammunition.
- Issued to Ministry of Interior Forces:
  - 55 vehicles, 740 sets of body armor, 7,405 weapons and 317,504 rounds of ammunition.

### BUILD:

#### Contract Award:

- FOB Solidarity, Special Police Training Academy (\$985K – ISFF); ECD is 1 Apr 06 (90 days).
- Commando Site #3, (\$920K – QRF); ECD - 20 Feb 06.

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*



### **Project Starts:**

- Renovations on the Zab Police Station, (\$70k--IRRF).
- Renovations on the Ranya Police Stations, (\$86k--IRRF). ECD is 08 Mar 05.
- Police Station Resol, (\$360k--IRRF), in Al-Karma, Al-Anbar Province, on 12 Oct 05. ECD is 10 Jan 06 and is 67% complete.
- Demolition of Salman Pak Police Station, (\$300k--ISFF). ECD is 23 Mar 06.
- Construction started on the Salman Pak Police Station, (\$1M--ISFF). ECD is 28 Jun 06.
- Construction started on the Check Point #19 (Al Bauaitha), (\$346k--IRRF). ECD 31 Jan 06 and is 45% complete.
- Construction began on IA 2/4/2 Bn Facilities, (\$354k--ISFF). ECD: 24 Jun 06.
- Construction began on IA 2/4/2 Bn Batufa Compound, (\$626k--ISFF). ECD is 24 Jun 06.
- Construction began on IA 2/4/2 Bn Qadish Compound, (\$795k--ISFF). ECD is 24 Jun 06.
- Construction started on the Southwest Fallujah Iraqi Police Station, (\$2M--IRRF). ECD is 31 Mar 06.
- Renovations started on the Peramagroon Police Station, (\$42k--IRRF).

### **Projects Completed:**

- Complete Al Kadhimya Patrol/Al Taji Patrol Station, (\$620k--IRRF),
- Zafarania POB, 3 BN/2 PO BDE (\$979K – IRRF)
- Baladiat POB, 3rd PO BDE HQ (\$324K – QRF)
- Force Protection Along Rt. Irish, (\$254K – QRF);
- Ali Al Gharbi Police Station construction is complete for a \$300k in Najadiya, Maysan Province.
- Construction is complete (four months ahead of schedule) for a \$300k Police Station Project in Al Amarah, Maysan Governorate.
- Upgrades completed on the Zakho Military Academy (ZMA), (\$402k--ISFF).

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

### MENTOR/EMPLOY:

- The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) continued Operation EID, Route Security with the 5<sup>th</sup> DIV assuming responsibility for the Khalis Road.
- 1 AR company for the 1<sup>st</sup> BN, 1<sup>st</sup> BDE, 9<sup>th</sup> DIV deployed to support Operation EID.
- Eighteen Iraqi Army Battalions, one Transportation Battalion, and two Police Commando Battalions are conducting operations in and around Mosul/Tal Afar.
- Twelve Iraqi Army Battalions, three Public Order Battalions, and one Police Commando Battalion are conducting operations in Ramadi/ Habbaniyah/ Fallujah corridor.
- Seventeen Iraqi Army Battalions, two Public Order Battalions, five Police Commando Battalions and elements of the 8th Police Mechanized Brigade are conducting operations in Baghdad.
- One battalion of Police Commandos, one Iraqi Army Battalion and Iraqi Police are conducting operations in Samarra.
- Three Iraqi Army Battalions and one Transportation Battalion are conducting operations in northern Wasit Province.
- One Iraqi Army Battalion and three Public Order Battalions are conducting operations in Salman Pak.
- Three Iraqi Army Battalions are conducting operations in Baqubah.
- Two Special Border Force Battalions are conducting operations in vicinity of the Al Waleed and Trebil border crossings. Border elements are supported by Department of Homeland Security Border Support Teams at 1.4b, 1.4d
- One Squadron is flying Infrastructure Reconnaissance and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions from Basrah and Kirkuk.